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SOME ANOMALIES IN THE KENTUCKY NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW
For nearly four decades' the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws has worked upon the general
program of making uniform the state laws upon "all subjects
where uniformity is deemed desirable and practicable.''2 On
of the first branches of the law to receive the attention of this
body was that of negotiable paper. It is easy to perceive the
reason why this body should begin its labors by drafting the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act. It has always been the
policy of the law to make uniform and certain those rules regu-
lating commerce and trade. Upon the adoption of the Federal
Constitution those matters pertaining to bankruptcies, 3 and
trade between the states4 were delegated to the Federal Congress
to regulate. The framers of the Constitution perceived then as it
is recongnized today by those engaged in foreign trade,5 that
different jurisdictions have different rules of procedure, differ-
ent rules of stubstantive law. This condition of the law can
'In 1889 the American Bar Assbciation appointed a committee on
uniform state laws. The legislature of New York followed in 1890, this
initial move by the adoption of an act authorizing the appointment of
"Commissioners for the promotion of Uniformity of Legislation in the
United States." In the same year the American Bar Association re-
ported a resolution that the Association recommended the passage by
each state of an act authorizing the appointment of commissioners to
confer with those of other states upon the promotion of uniformity in
state laws. In 1892 the first conference convened with nine jurisdic-
tions represented; in 1912 fifty-three jurisdictions were represented.
Address to the Conference in 1924,, by its President, Nathan William
MacChesney.
2 Article I, Section 2, of the Constitution and By-Laws of National
Conference on Uniform State Laws.
United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Sub-section 4.
'United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Sub-section 3.5In treating of the matter of commercial risks in foreign trade, It
has been stated that, "suits in a foreign court are not likely to be pro-
ductive of the most satisfactory results." Credits and, Collections,
Ettinger and Golieb, page 457.
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only result in a lack of confidence upon the part of the prospec-
tive seller and creditor in the remedies afforded him by the law
and government in the jurisdiction of the buyer. As a conse-
quence of this lack of confidence upon the part of the seller
he refuses to engage in trade, to his own and the community's
detriment. By reason of the close relationship between the
use of negotiable paper and the extension of credit, the need
of a uniform practice in the law of bills and notes cannot be
questioned. As a result of the efforts of this body, the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Act has been adopted in the fifty-three
jurisdictions represented by the Conference., Although it would
be a very difficult and practically impossible task to ascertain
the exact success attained by the enactment of this legislation,
it is possible to point out some phases of the law in which it has
proved a failure, in that the final results of the litigated cases
remain in irreconcilable conflict.
AUTHORITY To EXECUTE AND INDORSE PAPEI.
Some of the most far reaching and astounding conflicts,
however, to be noticed between the law of Kentucky and other
jurisdictions, cannot be charged to the inefficiency of uniform
legislation, as it results directly from a variation in the statutory
enactment from that which usually prevails. This is true in the
provisions regulating the authority of an agent to execute and
indorse negotiable paper for his principal. Although the courts
do apply a strict rule of construction to the authority of an
agent to bind his principal either by the execution or the in-
dorsement of commercial paper, it is generally held that the
authority need not be evidenced by a writing but may be con-
ferred by parol. This was the rule at the common law long be-
'The Conference is at the present composed of three Commission-
ers from the forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, Alaska,
Hawaii, Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands.
'The courts have been unwilling to infer that power from a gen-
eral authority "to manage a business," Golin.1ky v. Allison, 114 Cal.
458, 46 Pac. 295; or "to collect for the principal," McFadden v. Follrqth,
114 Minn. 85, 130 N. W. 542. In fact this rule is usually adhered to un-
less the failure of the court to recognize the authority would defeat the
main object of the agency. In N.ational Bank of the Republic v. The Old
Town Bank, 112 Fed. 726, 50 C. C. A. 443, the authority of an attor-
ney to indorse checks received by him was sustained when he had been
retained to make collections for several legatees and distributees resid-
ing in distant states.
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fore the enactment of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act.
In the case of Miller v. Moores an action on a note was brought
by an indorsee against the maker. The defendant set up the
defense that the plaintiff had no title to the note.9 The court
held however that parol, viva voce, evidence was admissible to
establish that the party signing the defendant's name was his
attorney in fact, and that he had been accustomed to sign the
name of the defendant upon notes. ,Likewise in the case of
The Bank of North America v. Embury,10 one menher of a
partnership gave authority to an attorney to execute notes for
the firm. Upon the trial of the case parol evidence was admitted
to establish the authority of the attorney. The court declared that
the counsel for the defendant did not even argue that authority
to execute and indorse commercial paper could not be given
by parol, but that in this case the authority was in fact given by
a written power, and that under the better evidence rule that
instrument should have been introduced rather than the parol
evidence. The court denied the contention, however, upon a
showing that the power could not be located after a diligent
search had been made. Again in the case of Rice v. Gove11 deposi-
tions of an agent were admitted to prove that the note in ques-
tion was executed as agent under parol authority. Again the
objection was not of the parol authority to the agent, but that
the evidence was that of an interested witness. The court held
that the deponent was disinterested and indifferent as a wit-
ness. If he received the money on the note as an agent he would
be bound to account to the alleged principal maker for the
amount; if he were acting as principal he would be bound to
the payee. The rule announced by the foregoing cases has been
codified in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, as it was
recommended by the Conference, and adopted by a majority of
417 Fed. Cases 341, 1 Cranch C. C. 471, (1807).
0 The indorsement on the note was as follows, "Pay to Richard and
Stephen Winchester, or order, 'signed' William T. Alexander, by his
attorney in fact, John T. Wellford." The note was then indorsed to
the plaintiff.
21 Howard Practice Reports 14, (1861).
"22 Pickering (Mass.) 158, (1839).
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jurisdictions.12  The provision of the act as thus adopted has
been upheld by the construction of the courts.1 3
Neither the legislature nor the Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky have sanctioned the rule as thus announced, however.
There would seem to be little room for doubt as to the intention
of the legislature, from the language used, of requiring the
authoritV to execute and indorse negotiable paper to be evidenced
by a writing.1 4 The Court of Appeals construed the statute
strictly and literally. In the case of FJinley v. Smith'5 the ques-
tion was raised for the first time. There it appeared that a
note was executed to a bank as payee. Upon its insolvency the
receivers instituted this suit in an attempt to realize upon the
note as one of the assets of the bankrupt. The maker asserted
the defense that the note was executed by his brother, as his
agent, without any written authority from him as maker. This
defense immediately raised two questions before the court: Was
the instrument negotiable?' s If so was it necessary to prove
the agent's authority to execute it by an instrument in writing?
The court answered both questions in the affirmative, finding the
instrument was negotiable in character, hence the necessity of
written evidence of the authority to the brother as an agent of
the defendant. The holding and rule thus announced was af-
nSection 19 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, as com-
monly adopted, provides, "The signature of any party may be made by
a duly authorized agent. No particular form of appointment is neces-
sary for this purpose; and the authority of the agent may be estab-
lished as in other cases of agency."
13It has been argued in some jurisdictions that have the statutes
requiring that the evidence of an agent's authority must be of equal
dignity as the act to be performed that since an indorsement can only
be In writing, evidence of an agent's authority to make it must also
be in writing. The contention has been refused, however, by asserting
that such a holding would completely nullify the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, section 49, which provides that when a transfer of a note
payable to order is made 'Without written indorsement, the transfer
vests in the transferee "such title as the transferer had therein. The
transferee acquires in addition the right to have the indorsement of
the transferee." McLeoa State Bank v. Vandemarlk, 51 N. D. 573, 200 N.
W. 42, (1924).
34 Kentucky Statutes, section 3720b-19, "The signature of any party
may be made by an agent duly authorized in writing."
165 Ky. 445, 177 S. W. 262, L. R. A. 1915F 777, (1915).
U The Negotiable Instruments Law does not apply to non-negotiable
paper. "If a note Is not a negotiable instrument within the meaning
of this act, then the rights and liabilities of the parties on it are to be
determined by the law as administered with reference to non-negotiable
instruments." Wettla fer v. Baxter, 137 Ky. 362, 125 S. W. 741, 26 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 804.
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firmed two years later in the case of The Inter-Southern Life
Insurance Co. v. First National Bank of Hazard.17  There it
appeared that the agent of the defendant sold treasury stock of
the defendant and received therefor a promissory note made
payable to the maker and indorsed by him. The agent also in-
dorsed the note over to the plaintiff and received therefor a
certificate of deposit. This the agent mailed to the defendant.
The certificate of deposit Was then negotiated by the defendant,
for which it received .cash. Upon the maturity of the note the.
maker refused to pay; and demand being made upon the defend-
ant as an indorser it also refused. The contention was that the
agent only had authority to accept cash for the sale of the treas-
ury stock, therefore the acceptance of the note and its indorse-
ment by him was not within the scope of his authority. The
court sustained the contention and stated that a verdict should
have been directed for the defendant. It stated that the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law places the indorser under primary lia-
bility,'8 and under the Statute as here adopted an agent must
be authorized in writing before the principal would be bound.
Granting the necessity of written authority to an agent in this
jurisdictioi the question as to the sufficiency of the written in-
strument, once that it is executed, still remains. It would seem
that the general rule announced above' 9 would apply. In the
case of Clinton v. Hibb's Ececutrix,20 it appeared that the hus-
band of the defendant, being in infirm health, executed a power
of attorney 2 ' to her, authorizing her to transact his business.
The defendant later signed the note, upon which this action was
instituted, as surety for the maker, in her representative capa-
city. 'The court held that the estate of the deceased should not
be liable. It most reasonably observed that signing a note as an
- 178 Ky. 95, 198 S. W. 563, (1917).
"Section 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides that,
"Every indorser . . . engages that on due presentment it shall be
accepted or paid or both, as the case may be according to its tenor, and
that if it be dishonored, and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be
duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder or to any sub-
sequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it."
"Note 7.
2 '22 Ky. 304, 259 S. W. 356, (1924).
= The power of attorney provided that, the wife should have power
"to attend to all my affairs, to sign checks, and also execute any notes
she may deem necessary In the conducting of my affairs."
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accomodation surety could not be considered as essential in con-
dueting the business of the principal by the agent.
The state of North Dakota has been cited 22 as one of the few
jurisdictions adopting the anomalous doctrine prevailing in
Kentucky,. illustrated above. Upon examining the cases upon
the subject, however, one finds that the North Dakota court does
not follow the doctrine. The case of McLeod State Bank v. Van-
demark, supra,23 holds that the authority of an agent to indorse
a note might be conferred by parol. This was an action by an
indorsee against the maker. The defense was the lack of title in
the plaintiff. To establish this the defendant argued that the
authority of the agent of the indorser, a corporation, should have
been evidenced by a writing. It appears that the theory 24 of
counsel was that of the learned author.2 5 The court, however,
overruled the contention. It appears that the rule upon
the authority of an agent to execute negotiable paper in this
jurisdiction is even more liberal than the rule to indorse the
same. In the case of Grant County Bank v. Northwestern Land
Co.26 the court not only dispensed with the necessity of written
evidence of an agent's authority, but held that apparent autfior-
ity was sufficient in the absence of actual authority. There it
appeared that the former treasurer of the defendant company
was also the cashier of a bank. In his capacity of treasurer of
the defendant, the individual had authority to and did act in
the capacity of a general manager of the business. The offices oft
the defendant, a trading corporation organized for the purpose
of dealing in land, were located in the same building as the bank
of which its treasurer was the cashier. This individual serving
in the two capacities unauthorizedly executed the note, which was
the subject of the suit, to the bank. The latter negotiated it to
the plaintiff. It appeared that the note was renewed upon its
maturity upon two different occasions. Shortly after the note
had been executed, and before its renewal, and its transfer to
the plaintiff, a group of eastern stockholders, becoming suspi-
cious of the activities of the treasurer, voted that position to
another. The individual formerly serving in the capacity of
Mechem on Agency, section 225, citing Civil Code, section 4314.
"Note 13.24Bupra, note 13.
"Supra, note 22.
28 N. D. 479, 150 N. W. 736, (1915).
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treasurer was then elected to the position of vice-president of
the trading corporation. By-laws were also passed purporting
to restrict the authority of the individual. It seemed, however,
that he was the only resident director of the trading corporation
and for that reason retained much of the actual control of the
business. The renewals of the note were negotiated thru him.
He at that time agreed to and did pay the accrued interest upon
the note to the plaintiff. The amount, however, was never
charged to the defendant upon the books of the bank. The plain-
tiff had no knowledge of the by-laws purporting to restrict the
authority of this officer. The court held, as stated above, that
the defendant should be liable for the execution of this note by
one clothed with ostensible authority.
It appears that South Dakota, like Kentucky, has a statute
of peculiar provision 2 7 which necessitates written evidence of
an agent's authority to bind his principle. This statute has also
been construed strictly. In the case of State Bank of Alcester
v. Weeks, 2s its provisions were brought before the court, when
an action was instituted by a "holder in due course" against
the maker. Three defenses were asserted by the latter: (1)
fraud in the inducement; (2) failure of consideration; (3) fail-
ure to prove title. Of these it is clear that only the last of
the three is available to the maker as against a bona fide
holder.29 The defendant proposed to establish the last defense
by showing that the indorsement 30 on the note was not author-
ized by a writing and for that reason invalid. The court sus-
tained the contention despite the fact that the plaintiff intro-
duced a letter from the defendant which assured them that the
agent making the indorsement had the authority to do so. This
2 "The signature of a party may be made by an agent duly author-
ized in writing. No particular form of written appointment is neces-
sary for this purpose." Section 1723 of Revised Code of South Dakota,1919.1 45 S. D. 639, 189 N. W. 941, (1922).
" Fraud is not a defense against a "holder in due course." David
v. Merchant's National Bank of Cincinnati, 103 Ky. 586, 45 S. W. 878,(1898). Neither is the defense of failure of consideration available to
the maker against a bona fide holder. Beattyville Bank v. Roberts &
Co., 117 Ky. 689, 78 S. W. 901, (1904) ; Grey and Powers v. The Bank of
Kentucky, 2 Littell (Ky.) 378, (1822).
'The indorsement appearing on the note was as follows, "Midland
Packing Co., without recourse on us, per Win. M. Colby, Ag't."
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they found amounted to neither a ratification of the act of the
agent, nor an act from which an estoppel could be raised.
None of the jurisdictions which have this unusual doctrine
has ever offered any explanation of its existence, nor reason
why the. legislature adopted it in the first instance. The Ken
tucky Court of Appeals 31 dismissed the matter by simply find-
ing that it was the intent of the legislature that the authority
of an agent to execute and indorse commercial paper should be
evidenced by a writing. Such a finding could not be seriously
criticised in view of the language used by the legislators. In
view of the very scanty history of the act 32 in the official record
of the assembly that is responsible for its enactment, the con-
servati.ve brevity of the court might indeed seem wise. What-
ever might have been the purpose of the legislature in changing
the act from that which usually prevails, it is consistent with
the provision of the Kentucky Statutes 33 which requires the
authority of an agent to sign the name of one as surety to be
evidenced by a writing. This statute has been brought to the
attention of the court many times and in all it received a literal
construction. It follows that we should not be surprised that its
kindred provision 34 in the Negotiable Instruments Act should
receive a like construction. The first of these statutes came
before the Court of Appeals in the case of Ragan v. Chenault.35
It was then stated by Pryor, J., that, "The mischief intended
to be provided against by this statute was to prevent the use of
one's name as surety in obligations so as to fix upon him a liabil-
31FinZey v. Smith, supra, note 15.
32 It appears that the Negotiable Instruments Law originated in the
Kentucky Senate in 1904 as Senate Bill number 35. Upon January 18,
1904 it was placed upon the calendar of the Senate and referred to the
committee of the judiciary. Senate Journal p. 123. Upon January
21, Carroll, Chairman of the Committee on Judiciary, reported the bill
favorably, and submitted that further consideration by the Senate be
postponed to a day certain. It was made a special order of the day for
January 27, 1904, at 12:10 p. m. and from day to day until disposed of.
The bill passed the Senate by unanimous vote. Senate Journal p. 262,
Section 19 appeared in the original draft as adopted, no amendment
being offered to change it, nor official record of a discussion of it upon
the floor.
"Kentucky Statutes, section 482, provides, "No person shall be
bound as the surety of another by the act of an agent unless the author-
ity of tbhe agent is in writing, signed by the principal; or if the princi-
pal do not write his name, then by his sign or mark made in the pres-
ence of at least one creditable attesting witness."
84 Carroll's Statutes, section 3720b-19.
"78 Ky. 545, (1880).
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ity with no other evidence than the alleged parol authority
given the principal, or some other person to sign the surety's
name." It was an action by the payee of a note against the
surety. The defense asserted was that the name of the surety
was written by the maker under parol authority. The plaintiff
relied upon a subsequent admission by the surety of the maker's
authority to sign his name. The court held, however, that this
was not sufficient; that at the most it could amount to only a
parol ratification to an oral authorization. It gave the original
authorization, which was insufficient, no additional force. It
appears, however, if the ratification had been in writing it would
have been sufficient.3 6  Professor Mechem 37 cites this statute
as an example of the few statutory requirements that the agent's
authority be evidenced by an instrument in writing. In this
connection he notes the conflict in the statutory requirements of
an agent's authority to execute a contract falling within the pro-
visions of the Statute of Frauds. 38 By way of explanation of
this situation a remote inference might be drawn from the fact
that in the original Statute of Frauds3 9 there is .a conflict in the
requirements for the appointment of an agent. By an infer-
ence even more remote, the explanation might be offered to the
question here under consideration that some jurisdictions follow
one section of the English Statute, while others follow another.
8The Kentucky Court subsequently held that an oral authorization
for this purpose, which was later ratified by a written instrument was
sufficient. The decision was rendered in an action against the sureties
upon an injunction bond. The injunction restrained the plaintiff from
the collection of an execution in the hands of a sheriff, issued in an-
other action between the plaintiff and a third party. The court re-
quired the execution of the bond upon decreeing the temporary
injunction. The principal had then represented to the clerk that the
defendants had authorized the signing of their names to the bond. When
the clerk ascertained that the security was valueless he demanded
additional. Defendants then ratified the authorization in writing.
Riggan. v. Crane, 86 Ky. 249 (1887).
8Notd 22.
MIIechem on Agency, section 223.
" Sections I and III of 29 Charles II provide that leases, estates,
etc., shall have -the force and effect of estates at will only; and that they
shall not be assigned and conveyed, etc., unless by a deed in writing,
signed by the parties so making the same, "or their agents thereunto
lawfully authorized by writing." Sections IV and XVII on the other
hand did not require that the agent should be authorized by a writing
but simply that the note or memorandum should be "signed by the
party to be charged therewith, or some othdr person thereunto by him
7awfully authorized." (Italics are those of the writer.)
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But whatever our private opinions might be, the fact remains
that the rule exists, without official explanation or justification.
NEGOTIABILITY WITH COLLATERAL UNDERTAKINGS
The rule upon the first question raised by Finley v. Smith40 ,
as to whether the instrument was negotiable or not, presents an-
other situation in which the aims of uniform legislation have not
been realized. The reasons for questioning the negotiability of
the note in this case was the fact that it contained a provision 4 '
for the deposit of collateral security to assure the payment of the
note. The important thing to be observed is the right of the
holder to demand additional security, if in his opinion 42 that
which has been deposited depreciated in value. It is interesting
to note that the failure of the courts to agree upon the conse-
quences of that provision arises as a matter of judicial construc-
tion, the statutory provisions applicable in the several jurisdic-
tions being the same. It was urged before the Kentucky court
that by reason of this provision in the note it was a promise
to do an act other than the payment of money.43 The court
recognized that the provison of this note did not fall within the
exception recited by the Negotiable Instruments Law4 4 pertain-
ing to the sale of collateral security, but held that the note was
negotiable anyway. The court reasoned that the provision did
41 upra, note 15.
4This provision is commonly found in promissory notes used by
banks. It follows the main body of the note, containing the date,
payee, place of payment and the recital of consideration. Following
the recital that collateral has been deposited with the bank, there is a
space for its enumeration, and appraised value. There is the further
stipulation that the maker shall deposit additional security if in the
opinion of the holder that which has already been deposited depreciates
in value. It is usually provided that if he fails then the note shall be-
come due and payable as if by the expiration of time.
42Some make the right to demand additional security depend upon
the decline of the market value of the whole amount deposited.
43Kentucky Statutes 3720b-5, "An instrument which contains an
order or promises to do any act in addition to the payment of money
is not negotiable."
"Kentucky Statutes. 3720b-5. "But the negotiable character of an
instrument otherwise negotiable is not affected by a provision which
(1) authorizes the sale of collateral securities in case the instrument
be not paid at maturity." (Italics those of the writer.) In the prin-
cipal case additional securities could be demanded upon the deprecia-
tion of that originally deposited.
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not contravene any positive provision of the act 45 and at the
same time it was consistent with that provision 4 6 of the act which
provided for the acceleration of the note upon the default in the
payment of any installment of either interest or principal.
The Supreme Court of Kansas had reached exactly the op-
posite result four years previous to the decision of the Ken-
tucky case. In Hollaway State Bank v. Hoffman,4 7 suit was in-
stituted against the maker by an indorsee. The defendant relied
upon the defenses of failure of consideration, and fraudulent
representations inducing the execution of the note. The pleas
were sustained by evidence which tended to prove that the notes
were given in payment of the purchase price of certain capital
shares of stock of a manufacturing company; that there was a
total failure of consideration as the stock was in fact worthless;
and that the sale of the stock was induced by the false and frau-
dulent representations of the president of the company. At the
close of the testimony the trial court ruled that the instrument
was negotiable, that the evidence of the defendant was not ad-
missible, 48 and directed a verdict for the plaintiff. Upon
appeal, however, the ruling was reversed, because in the opinion
of the appellate court, the instrument was non-negotiable in char-
acter and plaintiff here stood merely as an assignee, subject to
the personal defenses49 which were asserted by the defendant.
The decision of the Kansas court was based upon the very rea-
sons which the Kentucky court refused to recognize. In the first
place it was decided that the instrument called for the doing of
an act other than the payment of money ;50 and secondly the date
of its maturity was uncertain. It was urged upon appeal, as
"The court recognized the requirements of a negotiable instrument
to be (1) that the promise be expressed by an instrument in writing;(2) that it must be an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain In
money; (3) that it must be payable upon demand or at some fixed
future time; (4) that it must be payable to the order of a specified
person or to bearer.
"Kentucky Statutes section 3720b-2, "The sum payable is a sum
certain within the meaning of this act, although it is to be paid,"--" (3)
by stated installments with a provision that upon default in payment
of any installment or of interest the whole shall become due."
4185 Kan. 71, 116 Pac. 239, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 90, (1911).
'Supra, note 29.
"The assignee of a non-negotiable note takes it subject to the per-
sonal defenses of "fraud in the inducement," and failure of considera-
tion, provided those defenses exist at the time of the assignment.
Carlton v. Smith, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 647, 110 S. W. 873, (1908).
'The Kansas Statute is the same as that quoted supra, note 43.
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the Kentucky court held,51 that merely accelerating the due date
should not render the note non-negotiable. The provision of the
Negotiable Instruments Act52 for the acceleration of the matur-
ity date upon the failure to pay an installment or interest was
distinguished from the provision here under consideration, how-
ever. The acceleration in the former would be due entirely to
the delinquency of the maker; the attempted acceleration under
the provsion of the note here under consideration would be left
entirely to the caprice of the holder. Here it would depend upon
whether in the opinion of the holder the securities had so de-
preciated in value as would justify demanding the deposit of
additional securities. Upon that basis the date of its maturity
should be considered so uncertain as to render the note non-ne-
gotiable.
When the question was raised in Tennessee, the court fol-
lowed the rule announced by the Kentucky court. In the case of
West Point Banking Co. v. Gawnt et al.,5 suit was instituted
upon two notes with the provision5 4 mentioned above. The plain-
tiff alleged the depreciation of the security, and the failure of
the defendant to advance more upon demand. The defendant
admitted the execution of the notes but asserted that the con-
sideration for which tl~iy had been given failed. The question
of whether the notes were negotiable in form was thus put in
issue. The court after reviewing Holladay State Bank v. Hoff-
inan5 5  followed Finley v. Smith.56  In so doing it cited with
approval the criticism by one of the leading encyclopedias of
]aw. 7  it is interesting to note that one learned writer 58 has
found that the majority rule59 is that announced by the Kansas
case, though h6 finds that "there is good authority in favor of
',.1Svra, note 46.
Kansas General Statutes, sections 5255, 5257; Kentucky Statutes,
3720b-2.
11150 Tenn. 74, 262 S. W. 38, 34 A. L. R. 862, (1924).
"Surra, ncte 41.
r-Supra. note 47.
I'Supra notes 15, 40.
1 "The Kentucky court presents a very clear analysis of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Act." 1 Ruling Case Law Supplement, p. 917.
1 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., "Acceleration Provisions in Time Paper."
32 Harvard Law Review 747.
IOiupra, at p. 778, citing Lincoln v. Perry, 66 Fed. 887, (1895);
Commercial National Bank v. Consumer's Brewing Co., 16 App. D. C.
186, (1900); Strickland v. National Salt Co., 79 N. J. Eq. 182, 81 Atl.
828, (1911); Holladay v. Hoffman, 85 Kan. 71, 116 Pac. 239.
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the negotiability of the note." 60 After quoting Judge Carroll
at length in the Kentucky case the same writer reaches the con-
clusion that the rule announced therein is the correct rule.6'
NOTICE or] DISHONOR
Still further anomalous variations may be found in the Ken-
tucky law from the usual rules pertaining to notice of dishonor,
either for non-acceptance or non-payment. Those rules are
simply stated by the Negotiable Instruments Law62 to the effect
that notice may be either written or oral; and if written that an
insufficient notice may be supplemented by an oral communica-
tion. The Act has been enforced by the courts both according
to the letter and the spirit of the law. In the case of De La
Vergne v. Globe Printing C0.63 the action was brought by an
indorsee against the indorser. The note had been indorsed in
blank by the defendant and delivered to the plaintiff. It be-
came due upon February 5, 1913. Upon February 6, the bank,
at which the note was made payable, notified the plaintiff that
the same was unpaid. About 9 a. m. the plaintiff gave the de-
fendant oral notice to the same effect, and informed him that the
plaintiff was looking to him for payment. The court held the
oral notice was sufficient. It was also given within the time re-
quired: the day after the day he received notice of dishonor
from his agent for collection. 64 The Federal rule is also, in ac-
*Supra, note 58 citing, National Halt Co. v. Ingraham, 143 Fed.
805, (1906); Kennedy v. Broderici, 216 Fed. 137, (1914); Finley v.
Smith, 165 Ky. 445, 177 S. W. 262, (1915); mumford v. Tolman, 54 Ill.
App. 471, 157 Iil. 258, 41 N. E. 617, (1894); Empire National Bank v.
High Grade Oil Refining Co., 260 Pa. 255, 103 Atl. 602, (1918).
"'Supra, note 58 at p. 785.
6Negotiable Instruments Law, section 95, provides, "A -written
notice need not be signed, and an insufficient written notice may be
supplemented and validated by a verbal communication. A misdescrlp-
tion of the instrument does not vitiate the notice unless the party to
whom the notice is given is in fact misled thereby." Section 96, pro-
vides, "The notice may be in writing or merely oral, and may be given
in any terms which sufficiently identify the instrument and indicate
that It has been dishonored by non-acceptance or non-payment. It may
in all cases be given by delivering it personally or thru the mails."
6327 Colo. App. 308, 148 Pac. 723, (1915).
'"Where the instrument has been dishonored In the hands of an
agent he may either himself give notice to the parties liable thereon or
he may give notice to his principal. If he gives notice to his principal,
he must do so within the same time as if he were the holder, and the
principal upon the receipt of such notice has himself the same time for
giving notice as if the agent had been an independent holder." Mills
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cord. In the case of Piedmont Carolina By. Co. v. Shaw,65 the
action was instituted by an indorsee against the maker and the
indorsers. The note was given by the maker to a construction
company in consideration of the preparation of certain estimates
and specifications for the construction of an electric railway
from Spencer to Concord, North Carolina. The financial ar-
rangements for the road collapsed. Upon the maturity of the
note the bank, which was the holder of the same, gave notice,
orally, to the defendant indorsers, who were also the directors
of the corporation making the note. The indorsers discussed the
matter and finally decided not to pay the note. The court held
that the verbal notice was sufficient.
Before the enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law
in Kentucky this also appeared" to be the rule prevailing in this
jurisdiction. In the case of Bank of Kentucky v. Brokking &
Clarke6 6 the action was instituted by a purchaser of a bill of
exchange against the indorsers. The evidence was conflicting
as to whether the notice upon the dishonor was given in writing.
The trial court instructed the jury that if they believed that the
notice was not given in writing then the plaintiff could not re-
cover. Upon appeal the court held that this was error. It then
said, "Notice is sufficient if it apprises one of his liability. We
have been able to discover no authority against verbal notice, and
when the parties are so situated, that it can be given with cer-
tainty, there is no reason why it should not be held valid." The
court in reaching the conclusion quoted above recognized the
fact that it was the practice to speak of a "notice in writing"
upon foreign bills. They explained the matter by saying that
as a matter of necessity the parties to such an instrument had to
live at a distance. It naturally followed that they could com-
municate with each other more easily by a writing. Though a
written notice would be the more convenient form, the court
were not willing to say that it was necessary. In so doing they
very sensibly looked to the reason for requiring any notice.
Being only for the purpose of enabling those secondarily liable
to hold or to acquire an indemnity from the principal debtor, it
Ann. St., section 5154 (2), Colo. Revised St. 1908, section 4567; N. I. L.
section 94.
"223 Fed. 973, (1915).
w2 Littell (Ky.) 41, (1882).
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is difficult to see why a verbal notice would not serve the pur-
pose. The rule was changed, however, by the legislature upon
the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law.67 Again we
find that the court by a literal construction of the Act has made
it operative. In the case of Grayson County Bank v. Elzert et
al.,68 the payee brought an action against the indorsers. The
maker was a corporation and the indorsers were stockholders of
the corporation. The original petition recited. that each and all
of the defendants were anxious that the maker receive the credit
asked upon behalf of the corporation. To this a demurrer was
sustained because of a failure to allege any noticeof dishonor.
The plaintiffs thereupon filed an amended petition in which they
set forth the facts that the defendants were the stockholders of
the corporation and that they had actual notice of the dishonor
of the note. The trial court again sustained a demurrer to the
amended petition. This ruling was affirmed upon appeal, with a
brief finding by the court that it was the intention of the legis-
lature to exclude parol evidence of notice of dishonor.6 1 The
same observation might be made with this ruling that was made
previously, upon the construction of the change made by the
legislature in the requirements of the authority of an agent to
execute or indorse commercial paper.70 The rule, though requir-
ing a written notice, is satisfied without further formality. In
the case of Doherty v. First National Bank of Louisville71 an
informal letter 72 was held sufficient as notice of dishonor.
"Kentucky Statutes, section 3720b-95 provides, "Written notice
need be signed and an insufficient written notice may be supplemented
and validated by a written communication." Section 96 provides,
"The notice may be in writing and may be given in any terms which
sufficiently identify the instrument and indicate that it has been dis-
honored by non-acceptance or non-payment. It may in all cases be
given by delivering it personally or through the mail."
"143 Ky. 750, 137 S. W. 782, (1911).
10 Hobson, J. said, "The purpose of the legislature in striking out
the word 'not' in the first line of section 95 and in substituting 'written'
for 'verbal' in the third line was to exclude parol testimony as to the
notice and req ire it to be in writing; and so the words 'or merely
oral' were omitted from section 96. For if an oral notice was good
there is no reason why an insufficient written notice should not be
validated by a verbal communication."
"Supra, note 32. It appears that the original draft of this sec-
tion was not changed. An amendment was made before adoption.
Senate Journal, 1904, p. 261.
"170 Ky. 810, 186 S. W. 937, (1916).
2 The letter, however, contained all the essentials to describe the in-
strument. It embodied the amount of the notes, the date of their
maturity, the names of the maker and indorsers, and a statement that
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With the proposed amendment of the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law by the National Conference at Denver in 1926,
many are inclined to despair of attaining the dream of uniform-
ity in legislation and certainty in the law. There is much to
justify such a position. From that proposal, it appears that the
courts have succeeded in so emasculating the work of their re-
spective legislatures, that a new demand for uniformity is felt
immediately following the adoption of the old. The program of
adopting the present Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law was
only completed in 1924 when Georgia fell into line and made the
Negotiable Instruments Law nationwide in its application. It
'would be a presumptuous criticism that would attempt to lay the
general failure of the program of the National Conference either
at the door of the legislative or judicial branch of the govern-
ment. Both must share in the failure. The legislatures have
been guilty of using some very uncertain and abstruse language
in the act. The courts have reached the very opposite conclu-
sions in construing identical words. It is submitted that in our
jurisdiction, however, that our own particular contribution to
the establishment of uniformity and. certainty in the law should
be through the legislature. Though the court has varied in its
construction of notes containing collateral undertakings, from
the results reached in other jurisdictions it appears that such
sound logic lies back of its view that its interpretation is vir-
tually embodied in a proposed amendment.7 3 The other varia-
tions in the law pertaining to the appointment of agents, and the
method of giving notice of dishonor, and of supplementing de-
fective notices, exist as a matter of strict construction of legis-
lative changes. Should a uniform amendment be submitted, it
is to be hoped that Kentucky enlarges upon it to the extent of
making the whole act uniform.
College of Commerce, COLVIN P. ROUSE
University of Kentucky.
they had not been paid and demanding payment.
73The proposed amendment was as follows: "An instrument is not
negotiable which contains an order or promise to do any act in addition
to the payment 6f money, unless such additional act Is apparently in-
tended to render more secure and certain the payment of the sum to
which the order or promise relates." For a discussion of the whole
problem see "Proposed Amendments to the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law," by William I. Britton, 22 Ill. Law Review, 815.
